Significance of Spinocian philosophy in the theory of embodied cognition
Keywords:
Philosophy in Spinoza, embodied cognition, cognitionAbstract
Introduction: In addressing the value of Spinoza's philosophy for understanding the theory of embodied cognition, we aim first of all to approach the premises from which the author as a thinking being of the 17th century starts. The essential characteristics of his philosophical system and his ethics contribute to explaining how the theory of embodied cognition is heir to his philoethical thought. Materials and methods: We have started from a systematic and in-depth epochal and bibliographical study, which includes readings of the classic work of Baruch Spinoza. In order to clarify the intentions of the work undertaken, we have analyzed various studies associated with social cognition, in particular the theory of embodied cognition that account for their connection. Results: The 17th century is a century of closed dimensions, of systems whose structure includes a multiplicity of different theoretical bodies presided over by gnoseology, logic or the ontology-ethics-anthropology unit. Concepts about society and humanity had as their starting point the investigation of the individual and the need to make the world rational, that is, to renew it and keep it eternally changed. From this perspective, science acquires a true meaning when it is placed at the service of man. Discussion:The century is defined as the century of metaphysics, establishing Newton's mechanics as an invisible wall. Philosophy assigns a universal social and technical value to all its doctrines, that is, all philosophical currents are valued as producers of an absolute and definitive system of unquestionable truths about reality. Conclusions: In this context, philosophical positions are absolute and extreme, because philosophers are rationalists or empiricists; and materialists or idealists. From the gnoseological theory, the century inherits the best of Renaissance thought from these absolute perspectives and develops the modern conception of the philosophical system.
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